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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of the District Court's rulings on usurpation actions brought against individual
board members of the Southern Valley County Recreational District.
Procedural History
The Valley County Prosecutor in the name of the State filed Complaints for usurpation of office, and declaratory and injunctive relief, eventually against four individual directors, while the respective individuals were all still in office. A Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Notice of Hearing was filed on April 18 2011 setting the matter for hearing on April 28 2011 At that hearing the District Court declined to grant the restraining order involving specifically Ms Davis the Court finding that
there was not a showing of irreparable harm or injury and that counsel for the Defendants would not be
disqualified The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 26 2011 The State on
March 31 2011 filed a Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment Following the
issuance of the District Court's ruling in favor of the individual Defendants, but finding that the State
had an obligation to bring the actions and attorney fees were not awarded to the Defendants. The State
appealed and the Defendants cross-appealed on the issue of attorney fees.

The Southern Valley County Recreational District ("SVCRD") is a recreation district formed
pursuant to the process set forth in Idaho Code § 31-4304 and is located wholly within Valley County,
Idaho. In 2002, the SVCRD published specific Notice of Election Filing Deadline for the subdistrict (3)
position held by the Defendant Yvette Davis. For the subdistrict (3) term beginning in January 2003,
the Defendant was deemed elected pursuant to operation oflaw provided by Idaho Code § 31-4306(2)
as notice of the election had been properly published and she was the only qualified candidate to file
for the position.
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In 2006, however, no Notice of Election Filing Deadline was published as required. Affidavit of
Lorena Behnke in Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss, In. 1, n. 7, p. 3. ("Behnke Affidavit"). The
Defendant did not timely file a declaration for candidacy and no election was held for the office of
director, subdistrict (3). See, Id., Exhibit A. The SVCRD did not meet the alternative election
requirements for the Defendant Yvette Davis to hold the position, but yet she remained in office. The
SVCRD noticed a replacement election, however, the noticed replacement election was not for the
position as a director, rather the public notice stated the position for the office of president of the
SRVCD, a position that only the sitting directors, rather than the electorate of the District, are allowed
to cast votes for. LC. § 31-4309. 1 The notice of cancellation of election for the office again stated it was
for the president position. Exhibit A, p.3, Id. Regardless of the office title, there is no express statutory
cure for missing an election as contended by SVCRD Election Official, Lorena Behnke, in her
affidavit Id., at n 7, p.3. The Defense has cited no legal authority for this proposition. There is no
record of the SVCRD seeking judicial relief through a Declaratory Judgment for the missed elections in
2004 or 2010. There is no record of the SVCRD exercising the statutory cure to fill the vacancy for an
expired term, which is the appointment of a replacement by the Governor. LC. § 59-912. Defendant
acquired her position on the SVCRD Board through appointment by the Governor and it is the specific
relief the Plaintiff sought in this case. The SVCRD Election Official, Lorena Behnke, nevertheless
asserts, that the SVCRD efforts properly cured the missed elections despite that Ms. Davis provided
notice that she was running for the office of President, and not for the Board Member representative for
subdistrict (3). Id n 7, pp. 3 & 4.
No Notice of Election Filing Deadline was filed for election to the subdistrict (3) board position
for the statutory scheduled November, 2010 election. See Id., n 8, p.4; and April I, 2011 Affidavit of
I. 31-4309. OFFlCERS OF BOARD. The officers of the board shall consist of a president, a vice president, a secretary and a treasurer. The president and
vice president shall be elected by the board and each shall be a director. The secretary and treasurer shall be appointed by the board and may be a director
or any other person. The offices of secretary and treasurer may be filled by the same person. All officers shall serve at the pleasure of the board. Each
officer shall take, subscribe and file with the secretary an oath of office before assuming any duties. The board shall fix a compensation, if any, to be paid
to each officer which compensation shall be paid out of the funds of the district
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Matthew C. Williams, Exhibit B,

7r

3, p.2, of the January 5, 2011 letter from Stephanie Bonney. The

SVCRD attributes the missed 2006 election and resulting confusion (apparent conflict between the
fixed election dates and fixed terms of office as provided by statute and self-help "cure") as the reason
for also missing the 2010 election. Id.
After patrons of the SVCRD submitted a petition on October 26, 2010 2 asking the SVCRD
Board to investigate the lack of elections, the Board refused and referred the inquiry to the Idaho
Secretary of State who's office referred the petitioners to the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney
("VCPA") to investigate pursuant to the public office usurpation statute, LC. § 6-602. April 1, 2011
Affidavit of Matthew C. Williams, n 2, p. 1 and Exhibit A, p. 13 . Mr. Williams concluded that pursuant
to 1. C. § 6-602 and the referral from the Office of the Secretary of State, that his office was required to
investigate the issue. Id. His letter dated November 5, 2010 requested a meeting with the SVCRD
Board to address the issues and reach an expedient cure. Id. Instead, the SVCRD Board, as reflected in
the absence of entry of any such decision being motioned or made on the public record for any of the
November, 2011; December, 2011; January, 2012; and February, 2012, SVCRD Board Members made
a secret decision to not meet with the VCPA, but to pursue alternative measures in coordination and
cooperation with the Idaho Secretary of State and the Idaho Attorney General's Office contrary to open
meeting law requirements. See, Behnke Affidavit, n. 8, p. 4 and LC. § 67-2340 4· Even a cursory review
of the SVCRD Board minutes for the referenced November 18, 2010 meeting make it clear there is no
record of any discussion, motion, vote, outcome of vote or public decision with regard to scheduling a
replacement election, declaring the subdistrict (3) position vacant as of January 1; deciding not to meet
with Mr. Williams but to act in "coordination and cooperation with the Idaho Attorney General's Office

2 Behnke asserts at n 8, p. 4 of her affidavit that this event occurred on September 14, 2010, the date of the SVCRD budget hearing and well before the
October 7. 2010 deadline for write-in candidates.
3 Photocopies of at least 5 of the petitions are set forth in the April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 4,
4 67-2340.FORMATION OF PUBLIC POLICY AT OPEN MEETINGS. The people of the state ofldaho in creating the instruments of government that
serve them, do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies so created. Therefore, the legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of this state that the
formation of public policy is public business and shall not be conducted in secret.
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(Brian Kane, Assistant Chief Deputy) and the Idaho Secretary of State's [O]ffice (Tim Hurst, Chief
Deputy); appoint a replacement due to the expired term (in contravention of LC.§ 31-4305). Similarly,
there are no records of any discussions, motions, votes or decisions on these subjects in any of the
Board minutes from September, 2010 through (except a motion and second at the January 11, 2011
meeting to reappoint Davis to the vacancy pending the May, 2011 election which the minutes fail to
record a vote being taken and the outcome of the same. See, April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, rr 4, p.2;
and Exhibit 3, pp.1 - 36.
Despite SVCRD legal counsel acknowledging that there were missed elections and procedural
and substantive 5 election notice errors, Stephanie Bonney and the SVCRD Board Members refused to
meet with Mr. Williams and instead her firm attempted to cajole desired written positions from Hurst
and Kane. See. April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 1, pp. 4-8, February, 2010 Email exchanges
between Stephanie Bonney and Tim Hurst; and Id., Exhibit 2, page 2, April 1, 2011 Email from Paul J.
Fitzer to Brian Kane, Deputy Attorney General. The SVCRD and their counsel for some reason are still
waiting for those written opinions.
ln fact, the public records available of all three agencies: the SVCRD, the Secretary of State,
and the Attorney General's Office, do not reflect any public meetings, workshops, or any forum where
the issue was jointly (or even individually) addressed and decided upon as asserted by the SVCRD.
See, April 20, 2011, Annent Affidavit, Exhibits 1-3. The SVCRD still has no record of compliance with
law and that valid public decisions were made to declare the Davis board member position vacant and
call for the May 17, 2011 replacement election for the subdistrict (3) board position as a cure for
missing the election. See Id., Exhibit 3.

5. With regard to the notice of filing deadline in the 2008 election for subdistrict positions (I) and (2), states: I agree with him Cvlatt Williams, Prosecuting
Attorney) that the notice was published a couple of days early and should have referenced the specific subdistricts ... "The notice also neglected to advise
how many positions were open for election.
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Despite the summary decision of the SVCRD Board at the October 26, 2010 meeting not to
investigate the complaints, the SVCRD made another secret decision to backtrack, pull a 180 degree
reversal and did so without making that public policy decision on the record, following receipt of the
VCPA's November 5, 201 l letter. Stephanie Bonney, legal counsel for the SVCRD supposedly since on
or about April 2010, 6 appeared at the November 18, 2010 SVCRD Board meeting, made a presentation
and was questioned about who she represented: "All of us, or the Board?" Bonney first stated that she
represented the directors as opposed to the SVCRD and its patrons and later reversed her position,
saying she represented the SVCRD and the board members as decision makers for the SVCRD, or
words to that effect. April 13, 2011 Affidavit of Dennis Marguet,

1t

4, pp.2 & 3 .. Ms. Bonney

subsequently caused a featured "Guest" letter to be published in the January 19, 2011 issue of the Long

Valley Advocate, the official newspaper for the SVCRD, asserting to the public that she had
"independently" investigated the issues and basically decided that the SVCRD had cured all the
problems and would hold a replacement election for the missed November 2010 election at the next
election, May 17, 2011. April 20, 201 l Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 5, pp. 1 & 2.
At the SVCRD November 18, December 14, and December 28, 2010 Meetings, Yvette Davis
participated as an active officer and board member and there was no declaration or decision that her
board position would be vacant January 1, 2011. April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 3, pp. 19-21.
At the January l l, 20 l l meeting a letter from Yvette Davis was read expressing interest in "being
appointed to the Board seat that that was vacated January 1, 2011" (in advance of Ms. Bonney's
January 19, 2011 opinion letter in the Long Valley Advocate) Id., at Exhibit 3 p. 22; and Exhibit 5, pp. l
& 2 The minutes of the meeting were later attempted to be amended February 21, 2011 (after the VCPA
made written complaint regarding open meeting violations) to disclose that there was no discussion and

6. According to SVCRD Agenda for a special meeting and executive session at SVCRD Counsel's offices February 17, 2011 first voiding then ratifying
retention of Davis, as there were no prior public records of the decision to hire counsel by the SVCRD, but unfortunately, there are no board minutes for a
February 17, 2011 special meeting. April 20, 2011 AnnentAffidavit, Exhibit 3, pp. 32 & 33.
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that Yvette Davis was appointed to fill the position vacated for expiration of term until the May
election, but there was no call or vote recorded for said February 21, 2011 amendment. Id., at Exhibit 3,
p. 34. Ms. Davis and her legal counsel, who have multiple individual representations with other Board
members, and the SVCRD, assert before this Court, that such appointment back of Ms. Davis on the
vacancy they declared was required by LC. § 31-4305. 7 The specific provision on such appointments,
however, reads: "Any vacancy occurring in the office of director, other than by expiration of the
term of office, shall be filled by appointment by the board for the unexpired term." (Emphasis added).

The term had expired. Ms. Davis had already vacated the office, she was not a holdover as a matter of
record, even according to Paul Fitzer: "We declared the chair vacant on Jan 1 and the Board appointed

an interim replacement until the May election. You have any additional thoughts on that?" Id., Exhibit
2, n 2, p.2. April 1, 2011 email to Brain Kane.
In the first part of February, 2011 the VCPA sent the SVCRD a complaint about Open Meeting
Violations8 involving the failure to record disposition of motions, matters decided which were not
recorded in the agency minutes and lack of notice and procedure, 9 including hiring of counsel; the

7 31-4305. DIRECTORS QUALIFICATIONS -- VACANCY -- COMPENSATION TERM. Each district shall be governed by a board of three (3)
directors who shall manage and conduct the business and affairs of such district and all powers granted to such district by this chapter shall be exercised by
such board or its duly authorized officers and agents.
At any time after the creation of the district. the board of directors may. by resolution duly adopted, increase the size of the board from three (3)
members to five (5) members. The resolution shall provide for the designation of five (5) director's subdistricts. A qualified elector shall be appointed by
the board to each of the newly created director's positions, one (I) of whom shall serve until the first district election thereafter held, and one (I) of whom
shall serve until the second district election thereafter held.
Every director appointed or elected shall be a qualified elector and a resident of such district. Not more than one (I) director shall reside in the
same director's subdistrict. Each director shall take and subscribe an oath of office before assuming any duties which oath shall be filed in the records of
the board. Any vacancy occurring in the office of director, other than by expiration of the tern1 of office, shall be filled by appointment by the board for the
unexpired term. The directors shall receive no compensation for their services as a director but shall be entitled to reimbursement for the amount of their
actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties. Following the term of the initial appointment, a director shall be elected
for a term of four (4) years which shall begin on the first day of January of the year following such election and shall continue until a successor is elected
and has qualified.
8. 67-2342.GOVERN!NG BODIES -- RE QUIRE.ME NT FOR OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS. (I) Except as provided below, all meetings of a governing
body of a public agency shall be open to the public and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting except as otherwise provided by this act. No
decision at a meeting of a governing body of a public agency shall be made by secret ballot ...
9. 67-2344. WRITTEN MINUTES OF MEETINGS. (I) The governing body of a public agency shall provide for the taking of written minutes of all its
meetings. Neither a full transcript nor a recording of the meeting is required, except as otherwise provided by law. All minutes shall be available to the
public within a reasonable time after the meeting, and shall include at least the following information:
(a) All members of the governing body present;
(b) All motions, resolutions, orders, or ordinances proposed and their disposition;
(c) The results of all votes, and upon the request of a member, the vote of each member, by name.
(2) Minutes pertaining to executive sessions. Minutes pertaining to an executive session shall include a reference to the specific statutory
subsection authorizing the executive session and shall also provide sufficient detail to identify the purpose and topic of the executive session but shall not
contain information sufficient to compromise the purpose of going into executive session.
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Board vacancy; and executive session requirements. With the limited exception of incomplete
amendments, the general response from the SVCRD before the May election defeat and successful
recall elections of Keithly and Cowles, there had been an apparent decision to summarily and
immediately ratify actions after previously declaring the same void. The SVCRD listed two meetings
on its web site to be held on February 17, 2011 in Boise, Idaho, however, there are only minutes of a
work session. Notice of an Amended Special Meeting Notice and Executive Session for meetings in
Boise at SVCRD counsel's office, however, contains an agenda stating that the SVCRD "shall cure
purported open meeting act violations ... by declaring said actions void and thereafter the Board shall
ratify said activity and/or decisions rendered." Id., at Exhibit 3, pp 32 & 33.
In yet another example of secret decision making, the newspapers reported the $7,000 purchase
of used gym equipment by the SVCRD from Shore Lodge on or about mid-November, 2010. Id.,
Exhibit 6, p. 5. The SVC RD public records are devoid of any mention of this purchase opportunity and
execution.
At some time, the Board apparently secretly decided to provide and pay for the individual
attorney representation of Board Members who had usurpation actions instituted against them by the
VCPA. A hint to this effect was revealed in the February 16, 2011 edition of the Long Valley Advocate
which reported the following events:
The board was also brought to task by Dennis Marguet, another citizen in
attendance, who said he thought it was a mistake by the board to not solicit names from
members of the district who might be interested in filling Davis' seat. He said he was
sure that both Cowles and Smith would have voted to appoint Davis back to the seat
she's held since the recreation district was formed, but he said not to publicize the
opening and solicit letters of interest from others only "threw fuel on the fire" and
reinforced a belief that the recreation district board is a "secret organization".
"You make a good point Cowles said."

APPELLANT'S BRIEF,

P. 11

Marguet also said his understanding was that if Williams followed through on his
threat to sue the board members individually that recreation district funds could not be
used to defend board members.
"That's wrong," Davis said before board members again said they couldn't
discuss what was at that time only a threat of suits upon the advice of their Boise
attorney Stephanie Bonney.
April 20, 2011, Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 2, pp. 7 & 8, photocopy of February 16, 2011
article in the Long Valley Advocate.
Dennis Marguet also attended the SVCRD Board Meeting which occurred on or about March
21, 2011 (minutes not posted by the SVCRD) where he reports that the Board originally intended to
approve in "whisper," payment of the sum of approximately $9,700 from SVCRD funds for the private
representation of individual Board members sued for Usurpation by the VCPA. April 13, 2010 Marguet
Affidavit, n 7, p. 4; and see, April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 6, p. 15, Guest Opinion of Olin
Balch, "Burning money at SVCRD", April 13, 2011 Long Valley Advocate. The Board had advised that
the bill for fees in the amount of approximately $9,700 from Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke,
Chartered, was for payment for legal defenses of Board Members in the usurpation suits. Nowhere in
the VCRD Board Minutes available to the VCPA and the public, is there any item for business on the
hiring of the Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered at SVCRD public expense for the private or
"tort claim" legal representation of Board Members for usurpation. Similarly, there is no item or
discussion of waiver of any conflicts including dual and multiple representation and payment from
SVCRD public funds to defend individual board members for private usurpation actions at the expense
of the SVCRD and its patrons who they owe fiduciary duties by law. The clear language of LC.§ 311541 prohibits recreational boards from appointing board members to positions with expired terms as is
the admitted case with the Defendant Yvette Davis.
Davis, her fellow Board Members, and their counsel have asserted that the usurpation actions
are the result of improper personal motives and collusion for personal financial gain related to a
501(c)(3) nonprofit organization which operates a remarkable and outstanding park resource on the
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Payette River in Cascade, Idaho, open and free to the public, known as Kelly's Whitewater Park. The
philanthropist who has dedicated tremendous personal assets, time and effort for the benefit of the
public and Dick Carter, the Mayor of the City of Cascade responded with strong and logical denials to
these accusations in the April 13, 2011 edition of the Long Valley Advocate. April 20, 2011 Arment
Affidavit, Exhibit 7, (two separate letters to the Editor).
Despite these developments, and the clear and documented usurpation Davis, Cowles, Smith
and Keithly during the pendency of their suits, they accelerated the unlawful actions of the SVCRD
after the disclosures of the improprieties and refusal to meet were revealed and suit was filed. See,
April 13, 2011 MarguetAffidavit;. and April 20, 2011ArmentAffidavit, Exhibit 3, pp. 1-36
documenting by volume the dramatically increased SVCRD meetings before the trial court's decision.
On or about February 25, 2011, Defendant Michael Smith announced his resignation as a board
member. April 20, 201 lArmentAffidavit, Exhibit 3, p. 35. The SVCRD decided to provide public
notice of the opening but did not wait and for the notice to be published before making the subsequent
appointment of Mike Keithly to fill the new vacancy by vote of the two remaining directors, one of
which was the usurper Yvette Davis appointed contrary to LC. § 31-4350. See, April 20, 2011 Arment
Affidavit, Exhibit 6, p. 13, Defendant Mike Keithly's Letter to the Editor as published in the Long
Valley Advocate. Without the usurper Davis' improper vote as a board member, Keithly could not have

been appointed by the SVCRD Board due to a lack of quorum requirements publically recognized by at
least one SVCRD patron. Id., Exhibit 6, p. 15, Guest Opinion of Olin Balch, "Burning money at
SVCRD", April 13, 2011 Long Valley Advocate. That did not stop the Defendants however.
With regard to Michael Smith, it is undisputed that the notice for the board position he took in
2008 failed to identify what subdistrict board positions were up for election, how many board members
were up for election (from the notice there appeared to be one). The specific subdistrict position is
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required in the notice pursuant to LC. § 31-4306(1 ), which sets forth in part: "Each nominating petition
shall state the subdistrict for which the nominee is nominated."
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether the District Court erred by declaring the usurpation action against Yvette Davis' as

moot.
B. Whether the District Court erred in applying the de facto officer doctrine in usurpation
actions.
C. Whether the District Court erred in applying election contest requirements to usurpation
actions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the
same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Tolley v.

THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 259, 92 P.3d 503, 509 (2004). Summary judgment is proper where there are
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id; LR.C.P. 56(c ). The facts will be liberally construed and all inferences will be dravvn in favor of
the non-moving party. Id. The fact that parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does
not change the standard employed by the court in reviewing whether or not issues of material fact exist.
Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Pac(fic Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31P.3d921,

923 (2001). Each party's motion must be evaluated on its ovvn merits. Id.
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ARGUMENT
A. The District Court erred declaring the action against Yvette Davis moot because Davis
was no longer holding of office at the time the District Court heard the motion for summary
judgment.
The District Court essentially punted on the issue of whether Yvette Davis had been holding
office illegally from 2007 through May of 2011 when she lost the contested special election in May
2011 by ruling the election made any issue of usurpation of office moot. The District Court declined to
consider the merits of the claim even though there were substantial procedural defects in canceling the
2007 election, as well as, contrary to Idaho law, the outright illegal appointment of Yvette Davis to fill
the new term beginning in January 2011.

1. Yvette Davis unlawfully held office from 2007 through January 2011.

Though Yvette Davis held office on the SVCRD Board from 1998 through May 2011, Ms. Davis
never won or even faced an election. Of the elections Ms. Davis should have had to face, only the
2002 cancelled election was properly noticed, published, and then cancelled according to the provisions
ofldaho law. Unfortunately, the election practices and procedure standards all ran downhill under the
watch of Yvette Davis. Ms. Davis should have had to face an election in November 2006, however the
SVCRD Board failed to comply with the requirements of Idaho law and no election in November 2006
was held to fill the new term of the position held by Mrs. Davis. Behnke Affidavit, n 7, p.3. Ms. Davis
was appointed to the new term pending a special election. Though the records are suspect about Mrs.
Davis's appointment, she continued to function as a member of the SVCRD Board. She was her own
watch guard along with her fellow Board Members.
When the SV CRD published notice of the replacement election, the publication was for the office
of President. Id., Exhibit A, p. 2. No such office exists for purpose of election by the electorate, as the
Board consists of three director positions and the President is elected by exclusive vote of the Board
Members. These positions are distributed much like the elected positions of a Board of County
Commissioners. Though the registered voters of the entire county may cast a vote for a commissioner,
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the commissioner must live within the specified district to be eligible to hold office. The same is true
with a director on the SVCRD. Though all the registered voters living within the SVCRD boundaries
may vote, only qualified individuals living within the specific director's district seat that is up for
election may hold the office. Thus, specific notice of the specific director seat is needed to properly
identify which seat is up for election. The SVCRD failed to notify the public which director position
was open. It is important to remember this was a special election to try and cure the fact SVCRD
missed the election for the seat months earlier. Mrs. Davis was functioning as the president of the
SVCRD at the time. Though the publication was in error, Mrs. Davis filed the correct declaration of
candidacy. Id., Exhibit A, p.1. This error is compounded by the fact the SVCRD Board had already
missed all the deadlines for the November 2006 election. Further, Mrs. Davis declared candidacy for
an entirely different position than the SVCRD Board published. The SVCRD Board then published the
cancellation of the election for the office of President due to only one candidate declaring for the
position. Id., Exhibit A, p.3. No candidate declared for the position of president. These practi

es

failed to provide meaningful and statutory notice as required by LC.§ 31-1405, meaningful notice in
accordance with Mullane v. Central Hanover Bk & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865
(1950); and the voter's rights to suffrage. Idaho Constitution Article VI§§ 1; 2; & 4.
2. Yvette Davis was appointed to continue as an SVCRD Board Director in January 2011 in
direct contravention of Idaho law and it was a usurpation of office.
As bad as the errors were in the 2006/2007 election of the Director position held by Yvette Davis,
the errors in 2010 were even worse. The SVCRD missed all of the election deadlines for November
2010 for the subdistrict 3 Director position. Further, the District refused to acknowledge the
complaints of the SVCRD patrons regarding the missing of the election until well after being brought
up by members of the public in open meetings. April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit Exhibit 4, pp. 1-5.
The minutes are silent as to any decision by the SVCRD Board to hold a special election, yet it was
announced that a special election would be held. See, Id., Exhibit 3, pp. 1-36. Though there was no
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vote declaring the seat vacant, yet the SVCRD Board appointed Yvette Davis to vacant position of
subdistrict 3 that was vacant due to the expiration of the term. Id., Exhibits 3 at p. 22, and 2,at page 2.
(April 1, 201 lEmail from Paul Fitzer to Brian Kane).
The fact that Yvette Davis's term had expired and that she was nominally 10 appointed to fill the
expired term are not disputed facts. R., p. 52. Defendant Yvette Davis admits no election was held in
November 2010. Id .. The Defendant relies on Idaho Code §31-4305 as her support for her appointment
to the current term of office as Director for District 3. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss or in the Alternative Summary Judgment, p. 4.
The Defendant's reliance on LC. §31-4305 as justification for curing any usurpation is misplaced.
The third paragraph of LC. §31-4305, authorizes the appointment to fill office vacancies as follows:
Every director appointed or elected shall be a qualified elector and a resident of such district.
Not more than one (1) director shall reside in the same director's subdistrict. Each director shall
take and subscribe an oath of office before assuming any duties which oath shall be filed in the
records of the board. Any vacancy occurring in the office of director, other than by expiration
of the term of office, shall be filled by appointment by the board for the unexpired term. The
directors shall receive no compensation for their services as a director but shall be entitled to
reimbursement for the amount of their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the
performance of their official duties. Following the term of the initial appointment, a director
shall be elected for a term of four (4) years which shall begin on the first day of January of the
year following such election and shall continue until a successor is elected and has qualified.
(emphasis added)
The black letter law of LC. §31-4305 clearly empowers a recreation board to appoint persons to fill
vacancies with the specific exception of a vacancy caused by the expiration of the term of office.
Defendant Yvette Davis not only admits her term was expired but also admits she was appointed to fill
the vacancy of the new term. She then claims her new appointment cures her usurpation. The
Defendant's unreasonable reliance on this statute for her claim of defense is essentially asking this
Court to disregard the plain language and ignore a portion of the very statute she claims justifies her
remaining in office.
IO Idaho Code§ 67-2347 Violations, (1) actions at meetings failing to comply with the Open Meeting Law "shall be null and void", See, City of McCall v.
Buxton, 146 Idaho 65 6 (2009).
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3. Usurpation of office claim was not rendered moot by Yvette Davis's loss in a contested
election.
The usurpation action brought by the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (hereafter
VCPA) against Yvette Davis is a unique and seldom seen action. "LC.§ 6-602 [1] is a quo warranto
proceeding whereby the State, suing on behalf of the people, challenges the authority of an official to
hold office." People of the State ofldaho v. Wilkins, 101 Idaho 394 (1980), at 396, See also Tiegs v.
Patterson, 79 Idaho 365, 318 P.2d 588 (1957); Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621, 95 P. 26 (1908). "It has
long been established that quo warranto proceedings refer to the 'conditions that exist at the time the
action is brought. See, Wilkins at 396 quoting Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho at 639, 95 P. at 31.
In this case, the VCP A brought the case after Yvette Davis was appointed to fill the position after
the term had expired in an unlawful manner. The Wilkins court upheld previous decisions by this Court
requiring the claim must be actionable at the time it was brought. There is no authority on which the
District Court relied to determine the claim becomes moot once the person relinquishes office.
In fact, a determination that a claim is moot when the person leaves office essentially validates
the actions taken by the usurping officer while unlawfully holding office under the color of law. Here,
the usurping officer Yvette Davis played a vital role in filling by appointment another SVCRD
subdistrict director position, which she did not have the legal ability to do. Further, the SVCRD,
through the conducting of business by an illegitimate board of directors, continued to function and
enter into agreements creating liability for the constituents of the district, even after the VCP A filed
suit. The ruling by the District Court in this matter has the impact of allowing the wrong doer to
continue to damage the office and the constituents the office serves.
Further, such a ruling is in contravention of the Idaho Constitution, specifically Section 4, which
sets out the right of suffrage. By allowing someone to hold office when illegally appointed, without the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF,

P.18

authority of law, and in contradiction to the rules and laws set out to guarantee a right of suffrage, the
Court sanctions such activity as long as the person is out of office by the time the case is heard. In
contrast, by judging the case on the "conditions that exist at the time the action is brought'', as this
Court has done for more than 100 years, creates a policy that protects the public and discourages those
who hold office illegally from continuing their course of conduct contrary to what the public desires.
B. The District Court erred in applying the de facto officer doctrine to usurpation actions.

In granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the District Court failed to consider
the merits of the claim regarding the illegal appointment of Yvette Davis after the expiration of her
term. As discussed above, the District Court avoided the merits of the usurpation claim against
Defendant Yvette Davis by declaring the action moot due to her overwhelming election loss subsequent
to the filed usurpation claim, but prior to the hearing on the motions for summary judgment. The
District Court committed error when, without a basis in fact or the record, applied the de facto officer
doctrine to Pat Cowles and Donald "Mike" Keithly.
1. The District Court committed error when declaring the SVCRD Board was a valid entity
at the time Mr. Keithly was appointed.

The District Court glosses over, without analysis or recitation of fact, the validity of the Board at
the time Mr. Cowles and Mr. Keithly were appointed. "At the time of the appointment of both Mr
Cowles and Mr Keithly the Board was a valid governmental entity thus Mr. Smith and Ms. Davis held
their positions with authority oflaw and the appointment carries full authority of law." R., pp. 169 &
170.
Assuming, arguendo, Mr. Cowles' appointment was legal, there are substantial issues with Mr.
Keithly's appointment. First, Mr. Keithly's appointment happened after Mr. Smith resigned effective
February 28, 2011. April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 3, p. 35. Second, the appointment
happened after Mr. Smith and Mr. Cowles appointed Yvette Davis to her position in direct
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contradiction to Idaho law as previously argued. Id., Exhibit 3, p. 22. Both of the above happened after
various members of the public and the VCPA had brought the issue of the validity of the Board of
Directors to the SVCRD Board's attention.
By glossing over the issue of Yvette Davis's appointment after the expiration of her term, the
District Court granted validity to a Board that did not have validity and the presumption of being a
valid board. Even if Mr. Cowles appointment was legitimate, Mrs. Davis's appointment clearly was
not. With only one valid director there cannot be a quorum and a valid appointment cannot be made.
As a result Mr. Keithly' s appointment was an invalid appointment.

2. The District Court incorrectly applied the de facto officer standard set out in Whelan
case when deciding Mr. Keithly had not usurped office.
The District Court cited the case State v, Whelan, 103 Idaho 651 ( 1982) as justification for
determining Idaho has recognized the de facto officer standard. "Idaho has long recognized the de
facto office doctrine which sets forth the legal defect in a person's holding of a particular office does
not invalidate the person's official acts State v Whelan 103 Idaho 651 [.]" Memorandum Decision, R.,
p. 170.
The Whelan case involved two police officers and a challenge as to whether they had met the
technical requirements to exercise the authority of a police officer. (See Whelan ) This Court
determined the officers were not required to take an oath and went on to describe what is the de facto
doctrine and standard:
An officer de facto is one who actually assumes and exercises the duties of a
public office under color of a known and authorized appointment or election,
but who has failed to comply with all the requirements of the law prescribed as a
precedent to the performance of the duties of the office. People v. Cradlebaugh,
24 Cal.App. 489, 141 P. 943 (1914); e.g., Rogers v. Frohmiller, 59 Ariz. 513,
130 P.2d 271 (1942); Sheldon v. Green, 182 Okl. 208, 77 P.2d 114 (1938);
National Bank of Washington, Coffman-Dobson Branch v. McCrillis, 15
Wash.2d 345, 130 P.2d 901 (1942). A de facto officer performs his duties under
color of right of an actual officer qualified in law so to act, both being
distinguished from the mere usurper who has neither lawful title nor color of
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right. See State v. Britton, 27 Wash.2d 336, 178 P.2d 341, 346 (1947). Whelan
at 655.
In this case, Yvette Davis and the rest of the SVCRD were put on notice there were issues with
Yvette Davis's claim to office. April 1, 2011 Affidavit of Matthew C. Williams, Exhibit A, pp. 1 & 2.
The VCPA filed a usurpation action against Yvette Davis after she was illegally appointed to a director
position that was vacant because the term had expired. Yvette Davis had not been elected, as she was
part of the SVCRD Board that had missed the election filing dates for the second time for the district
director position she held and no election had yet been held. Further, Yvette Davis was clearly
appointed in outside of the authority granted the SVCRD Board by Idaho law. As such, her
appointment was not authorized by law and she does not qualify for de facto officer status.
Such a status should be reserved for situations as presented in Whelan, where two officers were
legally hired and performing work as hired, but may have missed the technical aspect of being sworn
in. Had Yvette Davis been lawfully elected but not sworn in, the de facto officer doctrine would apply.
Such is not the case. She is in fact a usurper which the doctrine, as explained by this Court, does not
apply. If she is usurping office she cannot validly operate as a de facto officer and Mr. Keithly' s
appointment was invalid.
The District Court incorrectly opines that Mr. Keithly's appointment did not result from anything
he did. See Memorandum Decision, R., p. 169.. The District Court is incorrect on two grounds. First,
it was well publicized the VCPA had filed an action against the Yvette Davis and Pat Cowles alleging
they were usurping their offices and had deprived the constituents of the SVCRD the opportunity to
select the board of directors and Mr. Keithly was aware of this action. See Affidavit of Kenneth
Arment. Second, Mr. Keithly had direct knowledge suits had been filed against the individuals
comprising the Board of Directors, including the prior holder of the director position he was seeking,
yet chose to continue seeking appointment to the office.
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3. The District Court committed error when declaring the SVCRD Board was a valid entity
at the time Mr. Cowles was appointed.
The application of the de facto officer doctrine with respect to Pat Cowles is a more difficult case
than the application to Mr. Keithly's director seat. Pat Cowles was appointed by Mike Smith and
Yvette Davis. Neither Mike Smith nor Yvette Davis had faced election at the time they appointed Pat
Cowles to fill the vacated director seat.
The SVCRD published notice of an election for board of directors, but did not publish how many
seats or which seats were up for election. Behnke Affidavit, Exhibit C, p. 9. The publication declared
there would be an election for the "office", in the singular. Id .. There were actually two director
offices up for election. Mike Smith was one of two people who filed for the position, the other being
Jim Roberts. Id., n 10, p. 5. Mike Smith did not declare which director position he was filing for. Jim
Roberts also declared for the position and also failed to declare what director position he was filing for.
Id., Exhibit C, pp. 5 & 6. Thus, there were two applicants for one advertised position for the 2008
election and by law there should have been an election. See I.C. § 31-4306 These issues were
compounded by the fact the SVCRD Board missed the publication deadlines for the 2008 election as
well as failed to publish which offices were up for election. Because the SVCRD did not follow the
election process set out in Idaho Code, the election was cancelled illegally and Mike Smith did not hold
office after a valid appointment or election.
Similarly, Yvette Davis did not validly hold office during the time Pat Cowles was appointed, as
argued above. She held office from January 2008 to January 2011 without the color oflaw.
The two directors remaining in office, Mike Smith and Yvette Davis, did not validly hold office,
they could not validly appoint Pat Cowles to complete the term vacated by Jim Roberts. As such, Pat
Cowles held office without a valid appointment and the de facto doctrine should not apply as set out
above.
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C. The District Court erred when applying election law to a usurpation case.

Rather than viewing this case as a usurpation case, the District Court incorrectly viewed the case
as an election challenge. Thus, the District Court applied an incorrect standard requiring the VCP A
prove that the result of the election would have been different but for the procedural error. See
Memorandum Decision, R., p. 168. The District Court completely missed the point-- It is the actual
absence of an election that brings this case about. Had there been an election, the District Court would
have been correct in applying the standards of an election challenge.
The District Court went on to opine the record was uncontroverted regarding the level of notice
the public had regarding the SVCRD Board director positions that were up for election.
Voters are certainly entitled to proper notice of an election and substantial
compliance with the law is to be followed to give the public an opportunity
to know when and where the election is to be held. Clearly where notice is
sufficient to appraise voters of the purpose of the election a notice of
election will not be invalidated. See Lind v Rockland School District 120
Idaho 928, 1991. The record before the Court is uncontradicted that voters
were given notice of the election and the purpose of the election.
Id.
The record is actually uncontradicted that the voters were not given substantive and procedural
notice of the election and purpose of the election. The election notices failed to properly identify the
offices that were up for election and in one case identified an office that does not exist. The publishing
dates were missed, and in two separate instances the elections were missed completely and separate off
calendar elections had to be scheduled. The only properly noticed replacement election garnered more
than one person declaring for the position and the incumbent Yvette Davis, who was the beneficiary of
several of the errors, was soundly defeated. There is no better evidence that the outcome might have
been different than the actual outcome when the SVCRD Board finally published a correct election
notice to the public.
The District Court went on to opine that procedural errors were not enough, as these procedural
errors must have "a clearly traceable causal connection to the deprivation of an elector or an estranged
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candidate's procedural due process rights or otherwise materially impacted the election process. For
these reasons the impact of these procedural errors is de minimus and at best speculative." Lujan v
D~fenders

of Wildlffe 504 US 555. Id., R., p. 169.

The State agrees with the Defendant on at least one point of law asserted early in the
proceedings: Tiegs v. Patterson, 79 Idaho 365 (1957) controls this action. In Tiegs, just as in the present
case, the defendant made the same argument that election contest laws were the exclusive remedy and
barred the usurpation action (in that case brought merely by the individual challenging the irrigation
district board's actions). This Court followed its prior decision on the same issue issued in Toncray v.

Budge, 14 Idaho 621 ( 1908) over 51 years earlier in concluding again that two statutes stand side by
side for the protection of the people with the usurper action reserved for the Prosecuting Attorney and
the Attorney General except for the one exception for the individual who asserts that he is the rightful
office holder. Tiegs at 365. The Tiegs Court quoted several additional supporting authorities but none
with as much length as the decision in People ex rel. Budd v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123:

'It is first claimed by the appellant that the District Court had no jurisdiction in the
premises, and that the only remedy in cases like the present is under the statute which
prescribes the mode and manner of contesting elections. * * * No proposition could be
more untenable. It is true that the Act providing the mode of contesting elections confers
upon any elector of the proper county the right to contest, at his option, the election of
any person who has been declared duly elected to a public office, to be exercised in and
for such county. But this grant of power to the elector can in no way impair the right of
the people, in their sovereign capacity, to inquire into the authority by which any person
assumes to exercise the functions of a public office or franchise, and to remove him
therefrom if it be made to appear that he is a usurper having no legal title thereto. The
two remedies are distinct, the one belonging to the elector in his individual capacity as a
power granted, and the other to the people in the right of their sovereignty. Title to office
comes from the will of the people as expressed through the ballot-box, and they have a
prerogative right to enforce their will when it has been so expressed by excluding
usurpers and putting in power such as have been chosen by themselves. To that end they
have authorized an action to be brought in the name of the Attorney-General, either
upon his own suggestion or upon the complaint of a private party against any person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or
military, or any franchise within this State. It matters not upon what number of
individual persons a right analogous in its results when exercised may have been
bestowed, for the power in question none the less remains in the people in their
sovereign capacity. * * *'
Tiegs at 370 & 371.
Below, counsel for the Defendant asserted the characterization that usurper actions are disfavored
by reference to monarch and his unchecked directions made over 400 years ago in another county. In
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the United States of America in general, and in Idaho particularly, an action on behalf of the people to
remove usurpers is favored as it supports good government and their constitutional rights to vote. Idaho
Constitution Article VI §§ 1; 2; & 4. On at least one occasion, this Court has pondered in a note why
the usurpation remedy was not used. Clark v. Ada County Bd. Of Com 'rs, 98 Idaho 749, n.1 753, 572
P.22d 501 ( 1977).
Throughout these proceedings, however, the Defendants have argued that the State has only
shown procedural error with regard to notice and statutory deficiencies. These procedural errors have
then compounded by void or voidable secret decisions made contrary to public policy and law. This
position of ignoring the fundamental substantive nature of notice, however, is made in defiance of the
golden standard of American Jurisprudence, Idaho's standard, of due process as set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed.
865 (1950) and utilized by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 211 P.3rd 787
(2009) as follows:
In Mullane, the court further held that " the notice must be of such nature as reasonably to
convey the required information ... , and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to
make their appearance." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873. In other
words, meaningful notice consists of both substantive and temporal components. That is, the
content of the notice must be such as to fairly advise the person of its subject matter and the
issues to be addressed. Notice must be clear, definite, explicit and unambiguous. A notice is not
clear unless its meaning can be apprehended without explanation or argument. Farrell v.
Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 1032, 729 P.2d 1090, 1095 ( 1986). In addition, notice must be
provided at a time which allows the person to reasonably be prepared to address the issue.
It is clearly a substantive defect if an official moves outside the boundaries of his district, but it is

only procedural error if notice of an election filing fails to identify what office for what district is up for
election, a defect that certainly causes more harm, disenfranchises more voters and interferes with the
right of suffrage more than the official later moving? In short, improper notice is more than a
procedural violation, and in the instance where the notice identifies an office that does not exist, it
cannot be objectively viewed as "de minimus and speculative at best." Integrity of the democratic
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systems and institutions require that unlawful actions may and must be addressedwhere, like here, there
had never been an election before and four election cycles of "irregularities" had proceeded without
accountability to election and open meeting law requirements by the responsible Board Members.

CONCLUSION
These cases are not about election contests. They are more about the lack of any election
contests and the lack of accountability from the individual directors of a public institution. Statutory
substantive and procedural notice requirements were waived without accountability to the judicial
system and public. They were never even acknowledged publically. Instead, statutory set elections and
terms of office were changed without accountability and without public record. This public agency was
run like a private club in terms of decision making. People might get upset if they were informed
elections were missed or botched for four cycles in a row. And when constituents asked the Directors to
look into the "irregularities" they summarily said "NO, go to the Secretary of State if you think
anything was done wrong" and they did. Then they were directed to the Valley County Prosecuting
Attorney armed with the citation for the usurpation statute, LC. § 6-602.
There is a "shall" in the usurpation statute, a shall that imposes upon the Prosecuting Attorney a
duty to bring a usurpation action on behalf of the people to protect the integrity of public institutions
when the individual officials in those public offices are there unlawfully and fight tooth and nail to
keep their workings and accountability secret. These individuals could have, most of us would say
should have, taken the opportunity to address the very public and legal concerns at issue in a
responsible and working fashion, but instead these individuals chose to dig in and fight to keep what
they had secret and to be accountable only to themselves, even reversing their very public and specific
decision not to clean it up themselves. Unfortunately, they made this reversal of policy; the apparent
policy to fight the Valley County Prosecuting Attorney; and the policy to have the district pay for
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attorney fees for the individuals, all in secret also, accountable they thought, only to themselves. They
didn't even have to pay for the fight.
These are not di minimus procedural errors where the law is substantially complied with and
people feel good about the integrity of their public institution over four election cycles. Ms. Davis, who
served from the inception of the district, was trounced in the May 2011 election. After the remaining
majority incumbent board members still did not heed the call for openness and accountability; they
(Cowles and Keithly) were trounced in special recall elections (also their first elections) at the next
opportunity in November, 2011. The people had the opportunity and motivation to speak in such a loud
voice because there was so much wrong and still they were not being heard. This likely would not be
the case if the law did not impose the duty on Prosecuting Attorneys to protect the integrity of public
office for local political subdivisions, who in the wrong hands, can out resource, outspend and mount a
great "war" effort for personal reasons if there is no accountability.
There is great value in the Court continuing to recognize and uphold the values of
accountability provided by Idaho Code § 6-602. The people of Valley County respectfully ask the Court
to uphold these values yet again and reverse the District Court on the rulings briefed herein.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2012

Kenneth R. Arment
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I caused a true and correct copy of the forgoing document to be served on the persons identified
below on the date and in the manner set forth below.
Paul J. Fitzer
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83 702
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

Two Copies Via U.S.P.S. Priority Mail, Postage Prepaid
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DATED this { r/ day of April, 2012.
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